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THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT AT 25: IS
THE LAW ACHIEVING ITS GOAL?
By Keith W. Holman 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA),2 which marked its twenty-fifth
anniversary in September 2005, was designed to “level the playing field”
for small businesses competing against larger, more sophisticated, and
more politically powerful businesses. Recognizing the importance of small
business in the U.S. economy, Congress enacted the RFA in 1980 to ensure
that federal agencies consider the needs of small business and other small
entities 3 when new regulations are written. At a basic level, the RFA
requires federal regulatory agencies to satisfy certain procedural
requirements when they plan new regulations, including: (1) identifying the
small entities that will be affected, (2) analyzing and understanding the
economic impacts that will be imposed on those entities, and (3)
considering alternative ways to achieve their regulatory goal while
reducing the economic burden on those entities. Although the RFA does
not require federal agencies to choose the regulatory approach that is the
1. Mr. Holman is Assistant Chief Counsel in the Office of Advocacy of the U.S. Small
Business Administration in Washington, D.C.; he specializes in environmental regulatory
issues. He received his B.A. from the University of Washington in 1983 and his J.D. from
Lewis & Clark Law School in 1988. The views expressed in this article are his alone, and
do not necessarily reflect the positions of the U.S. Small Business Administration or the
Office of Advocacy.
2. Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1981), amended by Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (1996) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2000)).
3. The RFA applies to three types of small entities: small businesses, small
organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions. Small businesses are defined
according to size standards published by the Small Business Administration at 13 C.F.R. §
121.201. Small organizations are not-for-profit enterprises that are independently owned
and operated and are not dominant in their field (e.g., private hospitals, private schools).
Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1165 (1980), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 601(4) (1996). Small
governmental jurisdictions are governments of cities, towns, villages, school districts, or
special districts having a population of less than 50,000. Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1165
(1980), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 601(5) (1996). The overwhelming majority of RFA
compliance issues relate to regulatory impact on small businesses.
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least burdensome to small entities, the overarching goal of the RFA has
always been to shift the culture within federal regulatory agencies towards
an appreciation of the value of small entities and to instill within them a
desire to act accordingly. As viewed today, after twenty-five years of
implementing the RFA, is the law succeeding in this goal?
Section II of this Article explains why small businesses need the RFA.
Section III provides a brief overview of the 1980 RFA, the 1996
amendments to the RFA, and Executive Order 13,272, signed in 2002,
which was designed to further internalize the RFA’s procedures within
federal agencies. Section IV discusses recent successes of the RFA.
Section V considers remaining weaknesses in the current RFA. Section VI
suggests further targeted legislative improvements to the RFA. The Article
concludes that in the wake of Executive Order 13,272, the RFA is
succeeding in spurring most federal regulatory agencies to improve their
treatment of small entities. While some agencies have not yet fully
embraced the RFA and made it part of their agency culture, small entities
and the American public have greatly benefited from the law.
II. WHY SMALL BUSINESS NEEDS THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
ACT
A.

Small Businesses Are an Important Part of the U.S. Economy

Small businesses have long been a critical part of the U.S. economy.
Using data from preceding years, the U.S. Small Business Administration
reported in 1982 that small businesses employed about half of the
American labor force, produced almost half of the nation’s goods and
services, and, according to one study, generated over eighty percent of new
jobs. 4 Small businesses also tended to innovate at a higher rate than
medium or large businesses. 5 Twenty-five years later, small businesses are
still an important driving force in the American economy. Small
businesses comprise 99.7 percent of all employer firms in the U.S., they
employ half of all the private sector workers, and have generated sixty
percent to eighty percent of the net new jobs annually over the last decade.6
These small firms pay forty-five percent of the total U.S. private payroll,

4. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT 4-5 (1982) (citing research by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for the
period 1969-1976).
5. Id.
6. OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1
(2005), http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/sbfaq.pdf.
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and create more than half of the non-farm private gross domestic product
(GDP). 7 Small firms continue to innovate more than large firms, producing
thirteen to fourteen times more patents per employee than larger firms.8
These small firm patents are more likely to be driven by leading-edge
technology than large firm patents are.9 Moreover, during economic
downturns, small businesses often fare better than large businesses;
increases in small business employment and self-employment often serve
to lead the economy out of recession. 10
B.

Small Businesses Have Been Inundated By Federal Regulations

The 1970s witnessed a flood of new federal agencies and ambitious new
regulatory programs. New agencies were created with sweeping remedial
missions, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 11 the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 12 and the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 13. Agencies
were equipped with powerful new statutory authorities such as the Clean
Air Act 14, the Clean Water Act, 15 the Endangered Species Act,16 the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 17 the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 18 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 19 and many
7. Id.
8. CHI RESEARCH, INC., SMALL SERIAL INNOVATORS: THE SMALL FIRM CONTRIBUTION
TO TECHNICAL CHANGE 3 (2003) (written for the Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business
Administration), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs225tot.pdf.
9. Id.
10. It has been suggested, based on self-employment data from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, that the rate of self-employment tends to increase during business
downturns. See generally DAVID AUDRETSCH ET AL., DOES ENTREPRENEURSHIP REDUCE
UNEMPLOYMENT? (Max Planck Inst., Discussion Paper No. 0705, 2001). The “refugee
effect” could mean that unemployed workers from larger companies who choose to start
small businesses help the economy weather downturns. Id.
11. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat.
852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335 (2006)).
12. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat.
1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651- 678 (2006)).
13. Highway Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-605, 84 Stat. 1739 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.).
14. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
15. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. §§ 1294-1297, 1281(a)).
16. Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544).
17. Resource conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90
Stat. 2795.
18. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat.
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others. By the end of the 1970s, scores of agencies had issued thousands of
regulations, and small businesses were complaining about the rapidly
growing volume and complexity of regulations. As one observer noted, “it
was a regulatory Wild West.” 20 Agencies were intent on promulgating
rules as quickly as possible to meet statutory deadlines, with little
coordination or practical guidance on how to comply with new
requirements. Also, agencies often failed to distinguish between small
businesses and larger businesses when they developed rules, believing that
a “one-size-fits-all” regulatory solution was adequate. Thus, small
businesses, which often were not significant contributors to the problem an
agency sought to address, were heavily and unnecessarily burdened by new
regulatory requirements.
The tide of rules issued by federal agencies did not ebb after the 1970s.
Agencies have continued to issue thousands of new regulations each year.
In 2004, for example, agencies promulgated over 4,100 final rules, down
slightly from the total in 2003. 21 Every year, the EPA alone lists more than
400 new rules that it plans to issue; EPA listed 416 such rules in 2004.22
Similarly, the 2004 Federal Register contained 75,676 pages. 23
C.

Small Businesses Are Disproportionately Impacted by Regulations

By the early 1980s it became clear that small businesses must bear a
greater burden in complying with regulations than their larger counterparts.
In the first “State of Small Business” report, the U.S. Small Business
Administration observed that:
Most [federal] regulations have stipulated the same compliance
requirements for small business as for large corporations. The relative
burden is much greater, however, because compliance costs cannot be
spread out over larger quantities of output. In short, small business has
found itself at a competitive disadvantage because of the existence of

1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678).
19. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
20. James Morrison, The RFA at 25: Some Reflections, SMALL BUS. ADVOCATE (Office
of
Advocacy,
Washington,
D.C.),
Sept.
2005,
at
2,
available
at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/septnewsletter05.pdf.
21. See CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., TEN THOUSAND
COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 1 (2005),
available at http://www.cei.org/gencon/030,04645.cfm. The 2004 final rule tally was one
percent below the 2003 tally.
22. Id. at 20 (citing OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, THE REGULATORY PLAN AND THE
UNIFIED AGENDA OF FEDERAL REGULATORY AND DEREGULATORY ACTIONS (2004)).
23. Id. at 1.
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efficiencies of scale in regulatory compliance. 24

Subsequent economic research has confirmed that America’s smallest
firms bear a disproportionately large share of regulatory costs. The most
recent study indicates that firms with fewer than twenty employees spend
$7,647 per employee each year to comply with federal rules, while
companies with 500 or more employees spend $5,282 per employee.25
This research, which updates similar 1995 and 2001 reports, suggests that
small business must shoulder a forty-five percent greater regulatory burden
per employee than their large business competitors.26
D.

Small Businesses Are Often Poorly Represented in the Regulatory
Process

Given the overwhelming number of rules being developed by the federal
agencies each year, it can be very difficult for small businesses to
understand how they will be affected and how they can have a voice in the
rulemaking process. Most small business owners do not regularly read the
Federal Register and cannot afford to hire a regulatory attorney to represent
them in the rule development process. The key to persuading federal
agencies to consider less burdensome regulatory alternatives is to suggest
those alternatives early in the rulemaking process. Too often, small
businesses only find out about a forthcoming regulation at the end of the
rulemaking process, when it is too late to get the agency to consider
alternatives. One account of this situation, written in 1964, still happens
today:
Often businessmen come down to Washington when they are almost
purple with apoplexy.
A particular piece of legislation or an
administrative ruling has been either passed or under consideration for
weeks, months, or perhaps even a year. When it is about to be finalized—
or even after it has been passed—the businessman shows up in
Washington for a ‘last-ditch effort.’ He must necessarily be aggressive
and antagonistic, in conflict with a policy or program whose cement has
virtually hardened. 27

Unless the concerns of the small business are presented to the regulatory

24. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT 13 (1982).
25. W. MARK CRAIN, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL FIRMS 5 (2005),
available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs264tot.pdf (written for the Office of
Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration).
26. Id.
27. WILLIAM RUDER & RAYMOND NATHAN, THE BUSINESSMAN’S GUIDE TO
WASHINGTON 3 (1964).
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agency early in the rulemaking process, the “cement will harden” and the
agency will often not address the concerns. To make matters worse, small
entities must vie against larger businesses for the attention of regulators,
and their objectives are often in conflict. Large companies with full-time
regulatory compliance staffs may actually welcome new rules as a means to
disadvantage and perhaps eliminate their small business competitors.
While trade associations can be helpful to small businesses, many
associations are controlled by large companies, leaving small businesses
without a clear voice.
III. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE 1980 REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT,
THE 1996 SMALL BUSINESS REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT FAIRNESS
ACT, AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 13,272
Faced with the problems discussed above, by the late 1970s small
business asked Congress for a new law to “level the playing field” with
large businesses. 28 The model for the 1980 Regulatory Flexibility Act was
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 29 the landmark
environmental statute. NEPA requires federal policymakers to consider the
environmental impacts of their actions. 30 Under NEPA, agencies must first
decide whether their proposed actions are likely to significantly impact the
environment. 31 If there will be no significant impact, the agency can issue
a “Finding of No Significant Impact,” thus concluding the environmental
review. 32 Conversely, if the agency anticipates a significant environmental
impact, the agency must prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
containing a detailed assessment of the environmental impacts and
28. One account of the genesis of the Regulatory Flexibility Act observed that:
Both Houses [of Congress] built, in a number of hearings over 10 years, a
conclusive record of disillusionment and discontent among the regulated. Small
businesses and small entities repeatedly claimed that uniform application of the
same regulations to them and to larger entities produced economic injustice. Four
congressional committees (the Senate and House Small Business and Judiciary
Committees), among others, heard damage reports from small businesses, small
cities and towns, and small non-profit associations. Federal regulations, it was
argued, imposed a disproportionate economic burden of compliance on them. In
the business sector, there is considerable evidence that uniform application of
regulatory requirements increases the minimum size of firms that can compete
effectively in that regulated market.
OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT:
BETTER FEDERAL TREATMENT FOR SMALL ENTITIES 5 (1980).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4345 (2000).
30. See § 4331 (declaring the Congressional purposes of this statute to encourage
“harmony between man and his environment”).
31. § 4332(2)(C).
32. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (2000).
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potential alternatives to their proposed action.33 Early in NEPA’s history,
the courts were faced with the question of whether agencies were
compelled by the statute to adopt the most environmentally sound
alternative. In 1978, the Supreme Court held that NEPA sets a mandate for
federal agencies that is essentially only procedural, and does not mandate
any particular substantive outcome from an environmental review. 34
The RFA’s regulatory flexibility review process is similar to NEPA’s
environmental review process. The RFA requires each federal agency to
review its proposed and final rules that are subject to notice and comment
rulemaking under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)35
or another statute to determine if the rules will have a “significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.” 36 Unless the
head of the agency can certify that a proposed rule will not, if promulgated,
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities, 37 the agency must prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis
(IRFA) and make it available for public review and comment. 38 The IRFA
must describe the anticipated economic impacts of the proposed rule on
small entities, and evaluate whether alternative actions that would
minimize the rule’s impact on small entities would achieve the regulatory
purpose. 39 When the agency issues the final rule, and cannot certify that
the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities, it must also prepare a final regulatory flexibility
analysis (FRFA). 40 The FRFA must summarize any issues raised by public
commenters, describe the steps taken by the agency to minimize burdens
on small entities, and explain why the agency selected the final regulatory
action it did, and why other alternatives were rejected.41 The RFA does not
require agencies to select the alternative that is the least burdensome for
small entities. 42
Problems inherent in the 1980 RFA became clear within a few years.
The first problem was that agencies routinely certified their proposed rules

33. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
34. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 548
(1978); see also Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227
(1980).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
36. § 605(b).
37. Id.
38. § 603(a).
39. § 603(c).
40. § 604(a).
41. Id.
42. Id.
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with perfunctory boilerplate language that lacked any factual basis. The
certification provision of section 605(b) had been intended as a way for
agencies who could be certain that their proposed rules would have no
significant small entity impacts to be excused from having to conduct a
Instead, agencies improperly used
full-blown impacts analysis. 43
certifications to evade the RFA regulatory flexibility analysis requirement
altogether. 44 The second problem was that the RFA did not provide
authority for affected small entities to challenge an agency’s
noncompliance with the law. 45 Concerned that RFA lawsuits could
paralyze ongoing agency rulemakings in the same way that NEPA EIS
challenges had, Congress narrowly limited judicial review under the
RFA. 46 An alleged RFA violation could only be considered as a factor in a
larger APA challenge, which made challenges more difficult. 47 As a result,
43. See § 605(b).
44. As the Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Frank S. Swain, observed in 1989, “[t]he initial
decision to certify a rule is the threshold question that triggers any further analysis by an
agency. Without an adequate means to challenge an agency’s certification decision, the RFA
has been viewed by some agencies as an unenforceable administrative procedure with which
they need not comply. The absence of meaningful judicial review has created a checkered
compliance record, dependent on each agency’s essentially voluntary commitment to sound
rulemaking practices or upon its responsiveness to pressures for fair regulatory treatment.”
Doris S. Freedman et al., The Regulatory Flexibility Act: Orienting Federal Regulation to
Small Business, 93 DICK. L. REV. 439, 463 (1989). In 1995, for example, Advocacy’s
annual RFA compliance report noted several agencies that had improperly certified
proposed rules without any analysis or factual basis, including the Department of Energy
(renewable energy production incentive program), EPA (storm water discharge permit
program), the Department of Agriculture (almond marketing orders), and OSHA (indoor air
quality rule). OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
CHIEF COUNSEL FOR ADVOCACY ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT,
CALENDAR YEAR 1994 6-10, 13-14 (1995). The annual report concluded that “[i]t is hoped
that the threat of judicial review would serve to influence agencies to take seriously their
obligations under the RFA. Agencies would have a disincentive to dismiss RFA
responsibilities through boilerplate certifications or insufficient analysis.” Id. at 24.
45. Pub. L. No. 96-354, § 611, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 611 (1982):
(a) [A]ny determination by an agency concerning the applicability of any of the
provisions of this chapter to any action of the agency shall not be subject to
judicial review.
(b) Any regulatory flexibility analysis prepared under sections 603 and 604 of this
title and the compliance or noncompliance of the agency with the provisions of
this chapter shall not be subject to judicial review.
46. Id.
47. Id. (“(b) . . . When an action for judicial review of a rule is instituted, any regulatory
flexibility analysis for such rule shall constitute part of the whole record of agency action in
connection with the review.”); see Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705
F.2d 506, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
[A] reviewing court . . . may . . . strike down a rule because of a defect in the
flexibility analysis. . . . EPA should have analyzed that option in its regulatory
flexibility analysis as well, but its failure to do so is a purely technical flaw that
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agencies knew that they could issue improper certifications or otherwise
abuse the RFA process with few practical consequences. 48 The third
problem was that a number of agencies simply ignored the RFA, including
the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Agriculture, and the
Department of Interior. 49
To address these problems, Congress amended the RFA by enacting the
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
(SBREFA). 50 SBREFA amended section 611 of the RFA to allow small
entities to obtain judicial review of an agency’s noncompliance with
sections 601 (definitions of small entities), 604 (FRFAs), 605(b)
(certifications), 608(b) (waiver of FRFAs) and 610 (periodic review of
existing rules) of the Act. 51 SBREFA also tightened the requirement for
certifications so that an agency must provide the factual basis that supports
the certification statement. 52 SBREFA also requires OSHA and the EPA to
convene small business review panels whenever their planned rules are
likely to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities. 53 The SBREFA panels include representatives from the
Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy (Advocacy), the
Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA), and the agency proposing the rule. 54 Small entity
representatives who will be affected by the rule advise the panel members
on probable real-world impacts and potential regulatory alternatives.55 The
panel prepares a report containing recommended alternatives to the agency
planning the rule and the panel’s recommendations are usually incorporated
into the proposed rule. 56 From 1996 through 2005, EPA convened 30
SBREFA panels and OSHA has convened 7 panels. 57

does not affect the reasonableness of the final rule.
48. See supra note 44.
49. See The Impact of Regulation on Small Business, Joint Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Small Business and the H. Comm. on Small Business, 104th Cong. 13 (1995) (statement
of Jere W. Glover, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin.).
50. Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612
(2000)).
51. 5 U.S.C. § 611(a) (2000). SBREFA also gave the Office of Advocacy authority to
file amicus briefs in appeals brought by small entities from final agency actions. § 612(b).
52. § 605(b).
53. §§ 609(b), (d).
54. Id.
55. For
information
about
these
SBREFA
panels,
see
http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/is_epapanels.html
and
http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/is_oshapanel.html.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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The RFA was further strengthened on August 13, 2002, when President
Bush signed Executive Order 13,272. 58 The Executive Order requires
federal agencies to establish written agency policies on how they measure
their regulatory impacts on small entities. 59 Agencies are also required to
notify Advocacy of draft rules that are expected to have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.60 Advocacy
established an e-mail address to expedite agency notifications of these draft
rules, notify.advocacy@sba.gov. 61 Executive Order 13,272 requires
agencies to consider Advocacy’s written comments on proposed rules and
include a response to those comments in the final rule. 62 Advocacy is also
responsible for providing training to the Federal regulatory agencies on
how to comply with the RFA. 63 Since training sessions began in mid-2003,
Advocacy has conducted more than fifty RFA compliance training sessions
for a total of forty-five federal agencies. 64
IV. RECENT SUCCESSES OF THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT
A.

Federal Agency Compliance with the RFA is Generally Improving

Available evidence strongly suggests that federal agency compliance
with the RFA is improving as agencies are learning to implement Executive
Order 13,272. 65 Every Cabinet-level department except the Department of
State has submitted written plans to Advocacy. 66 A number of independent
regulatory agencies that issue regulations have also adopted written policies

58. Exec. Order No. 13,272, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,461 (Aug. 13, 2002).
59. See id. § 3(a), at 53,461.
60. See id. § 3(b), at 53,461-62.
61. Memorandum from Thomas M. Sullivan, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Small
Business Administration, on Federal Agency Requirements under Executive Order 13,272
to Heads of Executive Agencies, General Counsels, and Agency Regulatory Staff (May 1,
2003), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/memoeo03_0501.pdf [hereinafter
Memorandum from Thomas M. Sullivan].
62. Exec. Order No. 13,272, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,461, § 3(c) (Aug. 13, 2002).
63. See OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., HOW TO COMPLY WITH THE
REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT: A GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 111 (2003), available
at http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/rfaguide.pdf.
64. The Author is a member of the Office of Advocacy’s RFA Training group, and has
conducted or otherwise been involved in fifty-three RFA training sessions.
65. See OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF
COUNSEL FOR ADVOCACY ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT AND
EXECUTIVE
ORDER
13,272,
at
8
(2005),
available
at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/flex/04regflx.pdf.
66. Id.
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on how they will comply with the RFA. 67 The Office of Advocacy now
receives early drafts of proposed rules from many agencies via
notify.advocacy@sba.gov, enabling earlier consideration of potential small
entity impacts and alternatives. 68 Moreover, as a result of receiving
Advocacy’s RFA compliance training, agency rule writers are consulting
with Advocacy staff much earlier in the rule development process to
discuss potential small entity impacts.69 Agencies are also responding to
Advocacy’s written comments on proposed rules when they publish their
final rules in the Federal Register.70 Furthermore, federal agency personnel
are attending more informal meetings with small businesses, such as
roundtable discussions, as a way to become better informed about the
potential impacts of their rules. Finally, many agencies have now
established small business offices that work to help small businesses
navigate the regulatory seas. 71
B.

The RFA Process is Enabling Agencies to Write Better Rules

A major benefit of the RFA’s regulatory flexibility analysis is that the
process puts the real-world concerns of small business directly in front of
agency officials. The same is true of SBREFA panels convened by OSHA
67. Id. Some independent agencies take the position that Executive Order 13,272 does
not bind them, since they are independent of the Executive Branch. Advocacy is
particularly concerned that eight independent agencies who heavily regulate small entities
failed to submit written RFA compliance procedures: the Export-Import Bank of the U.S.,
the Farm Credit Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Housing Finance Board, the Federal Maritime
Commission, the Federal Reserve System, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Id.
68. See Memorandum from Thomas M. Sullivan, supra note 61. In the author’s
experience, in the past, agencies simply mailed copies of certifications and IRFAs to the
Office of Advocacy. Mail addressed to federal agencies in the Washington, D.C. area began
to be subjected to special handling, including irradiation, in 2002. Accordingly, it can take
weeks for Advocacy to receive documents mailed by another agency. With these delays, a
proposal was often already published in the Federal Register before Advocacy knew of it.
69. In 2005, the Author had several such conversations with Federal agency personnel
and contractors concerning planned environmental and energy rules. Such early
communications were less common in prior years.
70. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel
Engines and Fuel, 69 Fed. Reg. 38,958, 39,156 (June 29, 2004); U.S. EPA, Standards of
Performance for New Stationary Sources and Emission Guidelines for Existing Sources:
Other Solid Waste Incineration Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,870, 74,890 (Dec. 16, 2005).
71. The EPA, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Labor, for example,
have each established an office or division dedicated to providing small business assistance.
EPA’s Small Business Ombudsman operates as an advocate for small business within the
Small Business Division in the Office of the Administrator. See http://www.epa.gov/sbo.
The Department of Agriculture’s Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization
can be accessed at http://www.usda.gov/osdbu. The Department of Labor’s Office of Small
Business Programs can be accessed at http://www.dol.gov/osbp/sbrefa/main.htm.
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or the EPA. With direct feedback and insight from affected small entities,
agencies tend to write rules that are better tailored to address a particular
regulatory problem. In recent years, the RFA has enabled small entity
representatives, including the Office of Advocacy, to become involved
early in the rulemaking process and suggest improvements to planned rules.
Regulations have been modified, given additional consideration, or even
withdrawn by agencies on the basis of real-world concerns voiced by small
businesses. In 2005, for example, the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA) finalized new structural and safety design
standards for records storage facilities that house federal records.72 NARA
issued this rule largely in response to small business concerns, voiced
through the regulatory flexibility process, that NARA’s pre-2005 facility
design requirements were unnecessarily stringent and costly. The final rule
still achieves the regulatory objective of protecting and preserving Federal
records, while reducing the regulatory burden on small firms that are in the
business of constructing records facilities. In another example, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) delayed the compliance
deadline for small public companies to comply with section 404 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 73 Part of the rationale for the delayed
compliance is to allow more time for the Commission to fully consider
whether the reporting framework that has been established for large public
companies also makes sense for small public companies. 74 As a further
example, in 2004, small businesses persuaded the EPA that a proposed rule
that would impose new storm water management and other water quality
requirements for construction and development activities was a costly and
potentially disruptive duplication of existing regulations that adequately
protect water quality. As a consequence, EPA withdrew the proposed
rule. 75
In each of these cases, small entity feedback to the agency made possible
by the RFA enabled the agency to make a better regulatory decision and
resulted in a better regulatory outcome. By giving agencies the information
they need to avoid imposing needless regulatory burdens on small entities,
the RFA can help these small firms unleash their productive energies to
fuel further economic growth.

72.
73.
74.
75.

70 Fed. Reg. 50,980 (Aug. 29, 2005).
70 Fed. Reg. 56,827 (Sept. 29, 2005).
Id.
69 Fed. Reg. 22,472 (Apr. 26, 2004).
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C. Over the Past Five Years, the RFA Has Helped Small Entities
Avoid Over Seventy Billion Dollars in Unnecessary Regulatory Costs
Beginning in 2001, the Office of Advocacy started calculating the
regulatory costs saved when agencies modify their regulatory plans
pursuant to the RFA and thereby reduce the economic impacts on small
entities. These cost savings are calculated both as one-time savings (such
as from the avoided capital cost of purchasing new equipment), and as
recurring annual savings (such as from avoided yearly operating and
maintenance costs). From 2001 to 2005, these one-time cost savings have
totaled $54.1 billion, while the recurring annual savings now total more
than $20 billion. 76 These cost savings represent instances where agencies
were able to find an alternative that addresses the regulatory goal without
imposing unnecessary costs on small entities.
The savings also
demonstrate that the RFA is succeeding in persuading many agencies to
take actions which reduce the regulatory burden on small entities.77
V.

REMAINING WEAKNESSES OF THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT
Despite the 1996 Amendments to the RFA and the signing of Executive

76. In Fiscal Year 2001 there was $3 billion in one-time savings and $1.4 million in
recurring annual savings. OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL FOR ADVOCACY ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REGULATORY
FLEXIBILITY
ACT,
FISCAL
YEAR
2001
13
(2002),
available
at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/flex/01regflx.pdf. In Fiscal Year 2002 there was $21.1
billion in one-time savings and $10.2 billion in recurring annual savings. OFFICE OF
ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL FOR
ADVOCACY ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT, FISCAL YEAR 2002
22 (2003), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/flex/02regflx.pdf. In Fiscal Year
2003 there was $6.3 billion in one-time savings and $5.7 billion in recurring annual savings.
OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., REPORT ON THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
ACT,
FISCAL
YEAR
2003
25
(2004),
available
at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/flex/03regflx.pdf. In Fiscal Year 2004 there was $17.1
billion in one-time savings and $2.8 billion in recurring annual savings. OFFICE OF
ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., REPORT ON THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT,
FISCAL YEAR 2004 22 (2005), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/flex/04regflx.pdf.
In Fiscal Year 2005 there was $6.6 billion in one-time savings and $970 million in recurring
annual savings). OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., REPORT ON THE
REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT, FISCAL YEAR 2005 24 (2006), available at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/flex/05regflx.pdf. The $20 billion recurring annual savings
estimate represents a lower bound; the total recurring annual savings over the six years,
adjusted by a net present value figure, would be larger.
77. Interestingly, it is likely that these cost savings will actually decline in future years
as federal agencies incorporate a greater sensitivity to small entity concerns into their
agency cultures. When an agency fully considers and provides for small entities from the
very start of the rule development process, there are no “cost savings,” but the overarching
goal of the RFA is achieved.
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Order 13,272 in 2002, some weaknesses remain in the RFA and its
implementation by federal agencies.
A.

Small Entity Impacts that are Foreseeable but “Indirect” are
Ignored

Courts have interpreted the RFA to require agencies to perform a
regulatory flexibility analysis only where the rule in question will directly
regulate small entities. 78 Situations often arise where a planned rule will
have significant foreseeable economic impacts on specified small entities,
but because the small businesses themselves are not actually regulated by
the rule, the RFA does not require consideration of their impacts or
potential alternatives. For example, a Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) rule that mandates fewer daily flights in and out of an airport will
have a foreseeable negative economic impact on shops and restaurants in
the airport that depend on airline passengers as customers. Yet, because
the FAA rule only regulates airlines, not businesses in airports, the impact
on shops and restaurants is outside the scope of the RFA. Many rules that
clearly impact small businesses never go through the RFA’s regulatory
flexibility analysis because their impacts are “indirect.”
B. Agencies Avoid the RFA by Regulating Through Guidance
Documents and Through Enforcement Initiative Consent Agreements
Because the RFA only applies to notice and comment rulemakings
conducted under section 553 of the APA 79 (or any other law requiring
notice and comment procedures), agency actions that are exempt from
section 553 are also exempt from the RFA. Guidance documents issued by
federal agencies are exempt from notice and comment rulemaking. There
has been concern in recent years that agencies issue guidance documents as
a way to expand the scope of their regulatory programs while evading the
public participation requirements of the APA and the RFA. It is clear that
federal agencies must follow notice and comment rulemaking procedures,
and related requirements such as an RFA regulatory flexibility analysis,
whenever they impose new legally binding regulatory requirements.80

78. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v.
EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 773 F.2d
327, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
79. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
80. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (agency
guidance document imposed new substantive Clean Air Act requirements on facilities that
necessitated notice and comment rulemaking under section 553 of the Administrative
Procedure Act); see also Chamber of Commerce v. Dep’t of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 213 (D.C.
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Another area of concern is in situations where federal agencies use
enforcement initiatives to compel regulated entities in a particular industry
to “voluntarily” accept a new substantive regulatory requirement. Because
legal agreements that resolve enforcement actions do not typically require
full notice and comment rulemaking, they are not subject to the RFA. Yet
many enforcement initiatives are settled with ‘global’ consent agreements
that force small entity signatories to agree to meet new industry-wide
standards. 81 Even though these new standards can have significant
economic impacts on small entities, these agency actions never undergo
RFA review.
C.

The RFA’s Mechanism to Consider the Cumulative Impact of
Regulations on Small Entities Works Poorly

Small businesses often complain about the difficulties in dealing with
the layers of regulations that agencies issue over time. Although a single
proposed rule may not impose a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities, that rule, when added to numerous
current rules, may cumulatively impose a crippling burden. This is the
regulatory version of the “death by a thousand cuts.” While section 610 of
the RFA requires Federal agencies to review existing rules periodically and
to consider eliminating unnecessary requirements to reduce the overall
regulatory burden on small entities, 82 agency compliance with this
requirement has historically been minimal at best.83 Most often Federal
agencies ignore the requirement altogether, or issue boilerplate language to
the effect that an existing rule has been reviewed and the rule remains
useful. 84 Apart from section 610, the RFA contains no practical

Cir. 1999) (OSHA directive held to be a rule requiring notice and comment rulemaking);
U.S. Telecom Assoc. & Century Tel. Inc. v. FCC, 400 F.3d 29, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (FCC
“clarification” held to be a substantive change in the agency’s rules requiring notice and
comment rulemaking); Office of Management and Budget, Proposed Bulletin for Good
Guidance Practices, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,866 (Nov. 30, 2005) (OMB Bulletin would establish
agency standards for the release of “significant” guidance documents).
81. See, e.g., Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed.
Reg. 4958 (Jan. 31, 2005). This EPA voluntary consent agreement concerning air emissions
from poultry buildings requires signatories to fund air monitoring studies to support air
standards. Id. While the agency solicited public comment on the consent agreement, the
agreement was not subject to notice and comment procedures, nor to analysis under the
RFA. Id.
82. 5 U.S.C. § 610 (2000).
83. See Michael See, Willful Blindness: Federal Agencies’ Failure to Comply with the
Regulatory Flexibility Act’ Periodic Review Requirement—and Current Proposals to
Invigorate the Act, 33 FORDHAM URB L.J. XX (2006).
84. Id. at __.
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mechanism to periodically evaluate and address the cumulative regulatory
burden on small entities. Each new regulatory proposal is evaluated under
the RFA independent of existing regulatory burdens. By contrast, the
NEPA review process allows some assessment of cumulative impacts.85
The RFA also considers sequential phases of a regulatory program on a
piecemeal basis, rather than as an integrated whole. EPA’s Clean Air Act
program to reduce air emissions from non-road diesel engines, for example,
was implemented in four distinct “tiers.” 86 The tiers were reviewed in two
completely separate SBREFA panels and IRFA/FRFAs, despite the fact
that small businesses would ultimately have to bear the burden of all four
tiers of requirements. This contrasts somewhat with the NEPA concept of
a “programmatic” impacts review, under which the impact of the four tiers
could have been evaluated together. 87 In general, federal agencies have
some incentive to “piecemeal” their regulatory programs into a series of
smaller rules. Not only does this piecemealing make it easier for agencies
to certify each of the smaller rules under the RFA, it also helps them avoid
having their proposal classified as “economically significant” by the Office
of Management and Budget and subjected to regulatory review under
Executive Order 12,866. 88
VI. RECOMMENDED LEGISLATIVE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE RFA.
To address the remaining weaknesses in the RFA discussed above, the
following targeted legislative revisions would be beneficial:
• CODIFY EXECUTIVE ORDER 13,272
Executive Order 13,272 is working well to persuade agencies to adhere
85. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 1975)
(U.S. Navy’s Environmental Impact Statement on ocean dumping must consider pending
proposals by other agencies to dump in the same area); Citizens for Responsible Area
Growth v. Adams, 477 F. Supp. 994, 1001-02 (D.N.H. 1979) (requiring agency to consider
impact of all contemplated federal projects on airport and related industrial park).
86. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel Engines, 63 Fed. Reg.
56,968 (Oct. 23, 1998) (defining Tiers I and II); Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from
Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel, 69 Fed. Reg. 38,958 (June 29, 2004) (defining Tiers III
and IV).
87. See, e.g., Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167, 1172 (S.D. Iowa
1972). The court held that a programmatic impact statement was required on a small,
fourten-mile highway segment, because building this small segment would establish the
approximate route of the remaining segments of highway and preclude alternative routes.
Id.
88. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). This Executive
Order subjects any “significant regulatory action”—which generally means a rule that will
have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more—to review by the OIRA. Id.
The Executive Order requires the agency to select the regulatory alternative that imposes the
least burden on society consistent with maintaining an agency’s regulatory objectives. Id.
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to the RFA’s required flexibility analysis process. As is the case with all
executive orders, however, Executive Order 13,272 could be weakened or
eliminated by a subsequent administration. Also, many independent
federal agencies assert that they are not subject to the executive order and
they make no effort to comply with it. Codifying the executive order into
statutory law will enable small entities to be confident that agencies will
continue to have their “feet held to the fire,” and that independent agencies
will also be required to comply.
• REQUIRE FEDERAL AGENCIES TO ANALYZE FORESEEABLE
INDIRECT IMPACTS AND CUMULATIVE IMPACTS
The RFA should be amended to require agencies to consider foreseeable
“indirect” impacts within a reasonable degree of a planned regulatory
action. The RFA should also require agencies to acknowledge and analyze,
to the extent possible, the existing cumulative burden on regulated small
entities. Taken together, these two revisions would yield far more useful
and enlightening flexibility analyses than are available under the current
RFA.
• STRENGTHEN SECTION 610 OF THE RFA
The RFA should be amended to strengthen the requirement that agencies
review their existing rules every ten years. The scope of this review should
include all rules issued by an agency, not just the rules an agency originally
determined to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number
of small entities. Moreover, when an agency has completed the required
periodic review of a rule, the agency’s conclusion about the continued need
for the rule—or the need to revise the rule—should be subjected to notice
and comment in the Federal Register.89 The RFA should also specify a
timetable for the completion of periodic reviews.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Regulatory Flexibility Act has always had two complementary
objectives. The first is to ensure that federal agencies follow specific
procedures to assess the economic impacts of their regulatory actions on
small entities, and then consider regulatory alternatives that would reduce
those impacts. The second, broader objective is to change the culture
within federal agencies so that they appreciate the importance of small
entities and reflect this appreciation in their regulatory actions. For many
years, the RFA, as a tool for regulatory reform, seemed to be doing poorly
at both objectives. Agencies either essentially ignored the RFA or
conducted perfunctory regulatory flexibility analyses. This situation
89. See, supra note 83, at XXX.
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improved after 1996, when, for the first time, small entities could seek
judicial review of an agency’s failure to comply with the RFA. The
situation has further improved since 2002, when President Bush signed
Executive Order 13,272. In general, federal regulatory agencies are now
doing a better job of conducting flexibility analyses and finding ways to
reduce regulatory burdens on small entities. While most agencies have not
yet fully embraced the RFA and made it part of their agency culture, great
progress has been made since 1980. It is clear that the RFA has benefited
small entities and the American public by improving the quality of Federal
rulemaking and reducing needless regulatory burden.

